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CONTENTS

	Page
Deadlock in the Preparatory Commission	382
Clash between Britain and France	382
Summary of Draft Convention	385
The Status of Disarmament	386
German Impatience	387
The Russian Proposals	387
Debate on the Russian Proposals	389
Cushendun Challenges Russia	389
Litvinoff's Reply	389
The Anglo-French Accord	390
Protest of the Press	391
The American and Japanese Replies	392
Rejection of the Accord	393
Summary of British and American Cruiser Strength	395

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The Disarmament Deadlock¹

THE abandonment of the Anglo-French Accord, according to Lord Cushendun in the House of Lords on November 7, leaves the disarmament situation in exactly the same position now as if the Accord had never been made. It leaves the League of Nations Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference still faced with the deadlock with which it has been confronted since the adjournment of its Third Session in April, 1927.

Ten years after the signing of the Armistice and despite numerous armament conferences, it is estimated by the United States War Department that out of a total world population of 1,600,000,000 there are about 6,000,000 armed men. In other words, 0.38% of the world population is actively under arms. Reserve forces total more than 27,000,000 or 1.73% of the total population. The total organized forces of the world are therefore, according to the War Department, about 33,000,000 or 2.11% of the total population.

1. This report is based for the most part on the official documents of the League of Nations.

In addition to this, the two principal naval powers, Great Britain and the United States, have continued the construction of cruisers unlimited by the Washington Conference. The United States Congress at its forthcoming session in December is to consider a bill authorizing the construction of fifteen light cruisers and one aircraft carrier at a total cost of not to exceed \$274,000,000.² Britain, in 1927, spent approximately £10,500,000 for new naval construction.

The League of Nations under Article 8 of the Covenant has approached the problem of disarmament from two angles—the political and the non-political. During the first five years—1920 to 1925—its efforts lay for the most part in the political field. During this period, League commissions wrestling with the problem put forward various schemes, culminating in the Geneva Protocol of 1924 which was also in turn rejected. Finally, in 1925, the League Preparatory Commission for a Disarmament

2. The bill provides no appropriation. In the event of an international agreement further limiting naval armament, the President is authorized to suspend the act.

Conference was constituted and charged with preparing the ground for a general conference. From 1925 on, the League's major work in this field has been in the more non-political realm of technical discussion of what might be termed the "mechanics of disarmament." A special committee has been constituted, subsidiary to the Preparatory Commission, which is studying arbitration and security.

The Preparatory Commission is the co-ordinating agency for the disarmament work of the League of Nations. In its plenary

sessions and the work of its sub-commissions, extending over the past three years, every question concerned both with the political and technical aspects of the disarmament problem has been raised. The purpose of this report is to present in brief compass a survey of the important issues and the divergent points of view which have caused the deadlock in the Preparatory Commission. It also discusses the Anglo-French Accord itself and the factors which have caused its renunciation by the British Government.

THE DEADLOCK IN THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION

Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations charges the States Members of the League with the "reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety." Furthermore, another article of the Versailles Treaty imposed disarmament on Germany "*in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations.*"³ It is this general limitation which Article 8 of the Covenant is designed to carry out.

The Preparatory Commission has already held five sessions in the three years of its existence. Its members comprise the States represented on the Council of the League, and countries invited by the Council which "by reason of their geographical situation, occupy a special position as regards the problem of disarmament and which are not otherwise represented on the Commission." Furthermore, any State not represented on the Commission is entitled to submit memoranda on matters in which it is specially interested and to be heard in support of these memoranda.⁴

The first session of the Preparatory Commission was held in Geneva from May 18 to 26, 1926. At that time two sub-commissions were constituted: Sub-Commission A, deal-

ing with military, naval and air questions and Sub-Commission B, dealing with non-military questions which may be referred to it. The members of Sub-Commission A are military, naval and air experts attached to the delegations to the Preparatory Commission. Each delegation to the Preparatory Commission has a non-military representative on Sub-Commission B.

THE CLASH BETWEEN BRITAIN AND FRANCE

From the very outset the Commission has been divided into two groups, a division which has for the most part persisted in regard to broad general principles in all subsequent debates. On one side the British Empire, Germany and the United States, Sweden and the Netherlands, together with sundry other small States, have usually agreed in general; on the other hand, France, Italy, Poland, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Jugoslavia and other additional adherents usually have been found standing together. With the exception of Italy, the States listed are allies of France. The position of Japan is difficult to classify although in naval matters, she is usually to be found agreeing with Britain and the United States. Thus the naval powers as well as the countries disarmed by the peace treaties and some of the smaller European States form one school of thought. The continental powers whose military forces are based on the conscription system and who have argued from the first that security must precede disarmament form the other.

3. Italics are ours. Preamble to Part V, Military, Naval and Air Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

4. The members of the Preparatory Commission before the 1928 League Assembly were: Argentine Republic, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Japan, Jugoslavia, Netherlands, Poland, Rumania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Uruguay.

The Committee of the Council⁵ had submitted to the Preparatory Commission a list of seven questions as the basis of the latter's work in preparing an agenda for the general disarmament conference. This questionnaire was in turn submitted by the Preparatory Commission to its Sub-Commission A which prepared a voluminous report upon it after holding eighty-six meetings. There was so little unanimity of opinion that the report was printed for the most part in parallel columns listing the delegations in favor of each reply and the arguments with which they supported their views.⁶

In spite of the fact that the work of the Preparatory Commission has been in the non-political field, the broad underlying bases of the disarmament policies of France and Britain, as the leaders of the opposing schools of thought, must never be disregarded. Briefly, the French view as publicly expressed at Geneva may be summarized as follows: That security must be guaranteed by some form of military and economic assistance against aggression as a necessary condition precedent to the reduction and limitation of armaments. It was this thesis which the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance embodied and which formed an essential part of the defunct Geneva Protocol.

The British, on the other hand, insisted that disarmament, although bound up with security, is in itself the greatest guarantee of security. They felt that if the disarmament process can only be started, security will follow and make it possible to proceed more rapidly to further reduction of armaments. This is also the view of the United States.

Coupled with these divergent opinions on the political side, we have the equally important differences in regard to the actual "mechanics of disarmament."

The most important general divergencies of opinion may be summarized under four heads:

1. Interdependence of all armaments vs. separate limitation of military, naval and air armaments.

5. The League Council itself constituted as a committee for the sake of convenience in procedure. The United States Senate sitting as a Committee of the Whole is comparable.

6. For text of the questionnaire, cf. F. P. A. *Information Service*, Vol. III, No. 2, *Disarmament and the Five Naval Powers*.

2. Limitation vs. non-limitation of trained reserves and material to arm them.
3. Limitation of naval armaments by limiting total (global) tonnage vs. limitation by categories of vessels as at the Washington Conference.
4. International supervision of armaments vs. reliance upon the good faith of the signatories of a general disarmament convention.

INTERDEPENDENCE OF ARMAMENTS

The French group have consistently maintained that land, sea and air armaments form an interdependent whole which must be considered together; that any agreements for limitation and reduction, in order to be effective, must be universal; and that there must be a single standard system applicable to all countries of the world. It was this contention among others which prompted both the French and Italian refusals of President Coolidge's invitation to the naval conference which was held in Geneva during the summer of 1927. The French rely for their defense primarily on their army and secondarily on submarines and aircraft. They feel that their security would be impaired, were their army reduced without compensation in the field of naval and air armaments or vice versa. Britain and the United States, on the other hand, relying as they do on their navies for defense, see no reason why the various classes of armaments cannot be reduced separately. They have, therefore, consistently argued that the "broad principles which underlie the main functions of each of the three services [military, naval and air] appear to be so distinct as to warrant their consideration separately and not in combination." Otherwise, this group contends, the process of limitation would tend to be needlessly complicated and delayed.

TRAINED RESERVES

The French group have maintained that trained reserves and *matériel* cannot be limited while the British group in the Commission have as consistently demanded that trained reserves and the material held in stock to arm and equip them are possible of limitation. Limitation of trained reserves and *matériel* strikes at the very basis of the

system of conscript armies, for the conscription system is based on the principle of building up a large number of trained reserves which may be called out at any time. The supporters of non-limitation of these factors are all countries maintaining the system of compulsory military service while the opposing group is composed of States with professional armies and no compulsory service. The French group in defining "armaments" include the whole resources which can be used by a country in carrying on war—industrial, financial, economic and human. This is the so-called theory of "war potential." The entire Commission did, however, agree that it was impracticable at present to limit the ultimate war strength of a country. The British group included in its definition of armaments (1) forces in service in peace time and (2) forces prepared for wartime, but excluded the general resources of a country from the definition.

GLOBAL TONNAGE VS. CATEGORIES OF VESSELS

Limitation by global tonnage sponsored by the French group, means that each country would be allowed to build whatever type of ship it desired within a total tonnage to be agreed upon. For example, if Britain and France were each allowed 100,000 tons, France could build 100 submarines of 1,000 tons each, while Britain, if it chose, could build ten 10,000 ton cruisers. The opposing theory which has been supported primarily by Britain, the United States and Japan is that naval armaments should be limited by categories or classes of ships. This was the theory of the Washington Conference which limited capital ships and aircraft carriers. Before the Coolidge Conference in 1927, the experts on Sub-Commission A of the British Empire, the United States, Japan, Argentina and Chile had agreed that combatant vessels subject to limitation should include the following categories: capital ships, aircraft carriers, cruisers (of all kinds), flotilla leaders, destroyers, submarines and such other special types as might be included in the agreement. This classification did not attempt to divide cruisers into two categories. The reason for the failure of the Coolidge Conference despite this apparent agreement in principle is discussed later.⁷

7. Cf. p. 386.

INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION

In regard to international supervision and control of armaments under a future disarmament agreement, there has been a sharp difference of opinion. The French group with the exception of Italy supported international supervision, feeling that only in this way could they be sure that every one was living up to the terms of the agreement. The other group, supported also by Italy, maintained that supervision would foment ill-will and suspicion rather than confidence and therefore were willing to put their trust in the good faith of the countries concerned.

When the Preparatory Commission met in Geneva for its Third Session from March 21 to April 26, 1927, it had before it the immense amount of material which had been collected during its own previous sessions and the 100 odd meetings of its sub-commissions, notably Sub-Commission A. All this material showed, as we have seen, apparently irreconcilable differences of opinion between the members of the Commission. Viewed from the outside, the work of the Preparatory Commission during the first year of its existence was generally regarded as negative. It was felt by critics, anxious for real disarmament, that the members of the Commission had lost themselves in a maze of technical details and had accomplished nothing. Others maintained that disarmament was impossible without laying a firm foundation by the study of these technicalities and that the process could not be hurried.

In order to facilitate the work of the Commission, Lord Cecil of Britain introduced a draft convention embodying the British views of disarmament, which was presented to the Commission for discussion at the opening meeting of its Third Session on March 21, 1927. A few days later, the head of the French delegation, M. Paul-Boncour, introduced a draft convention based on the French thesis of disarmament. The Commission prepared a so-called synoptic draft combining the two conventions and proceeded to discuss this synopsis for more than a month. The minutes of this session are even bulkier than those of previous meetings, and at the end, the Commission had

advanced only a little farther on the road to agreement.

The draft convention was designed to form the basis of a possible disarmament treaty for consideration at a general disarmament conference. The Preparatory Commission subjected it to a "first reading" and it was then referred to the governments for consideration and has not since been discussed in the Commission. In its present form, con-

tradictory drafts are printed in parallel columns on many crucial points, indicating that no agreement on these issues was reached in the Commission.

The chief points in the draft convention are summarized in the following table. It has seemed clearer to use parallel columns where disagreement obtains and to print the points on which there was agreement directly across both columns.

SUMMARY OF DRAFT CONVENTION

BRITISH GROUP

Land Forces Men

In general it was agreed that the main method should be limitation of "effectives," i.e., men capable of being put into the field; and of the proportion of officers and non-commissioned officers to men.

Limitation of such trained reserves as could be put into the field within a certain period after the outbreak of hostilities.

Limitation of the period of service in conscript armies.

Material

No agreement as to the reduction of guns, tanks, ammunition, etc., i.e., the material of land warfare. Germany pressed for limitation of material.

Naval Forces Men

It was subsequently agreed to consider the limitation of naval personnel.

Material

Limitation of material rather than of men might be the main method in this field.

Limitation not only of total tonnage of fleets but also of warships (and their armament), class by class (battleships, cruisers, destroyers, etc.).

France proposed that agreements on future building programs should deal separately with each class, but that the figures thus agreed upon might afterwards be redistributed between the different classes, after a year's notice to the League had been given.

Naval Forces Material

Italy held out for limitation by global tonnage only.

Air Forces Military Aircraft

Agreed to limit horsepower and numbers, both for land and sea aircraft. (Material in reserve was not dealt with.)

Civil Aircraft

Agreed to discourage by various means the equipment of civil aircraft and the training of civil airmen for military purposes.

International aviation undertakings are to be encouraged.

Budgetary Expenditure

As a help towards limitation of expenditure, publicity should annually be given to the estimated and actual figures in a standard form.

International Supervision

It is better to rely on good faith and the ordinary procedure of the Covenant. Each sovereign State should retain the right to veto a League inquiry within its own territory.

An international body should be empowered to supervise fulfillment of disarmament agreement.

THE STATUS OF THE DISARMAMENT QUESTION

Except for an agreement that the period of service in conscript armies should be limited, and the decision to limit military aircraft both in horsepower and numbers, the deadlock in the Preparatory Commission remains. Nor are these slight advances in any way binding. The Commission has put the convention through one reading and on a second reading, it may be changed entirely.

During the summer of 1927, the Coolidge Three Power Naval Conference met in Geneva without coming to agreement on limitation of cruisers, destroyers or submarines.⁸

The failure of the Conference was due to lack of agreement between Britain and the United States on cruiser limitation. Britain felt that the demands of her world empire necessitated a large number of small cruisers. The United States, on the other hand, insisted that because of its lack of naval bases, it required a certain number of large cruisers with greater cruising radius. The British delegation interjected a new element into the situation by proposing that cruisers be divided into two classes: 10,000 ton eight-inch gun and 7,500 ton six-inch gun cruisers. Subsequently the British proposed to reduce the latter class to 6,000 ton cruisers and suggested that the number of each class of cruisers should be fixed by agreement. Although the American delegation agreed in principle to accept a secondary class of cruisers, the number of small cruisers insisted upon by Britain as a minimum exceeded in total tonnage the maximum figure proposed by the United States. This difference is important in the light of the Anglo-French Naval Accord of 1928 and the American note of September 28, 1928, commenting on the Accord.⁹

The Eighth Assembly of the League which met in Geneva during September 1927 was faced with the fact that the Three Power Naval Conference had failed of agreement. While this only indirectly concerned the League since the Conference had not been held under its auspices, it nevertheless under-

lined the differences of opinion in regard to naval limitation embodied in the Preparatory Commission's draft convention which had been referred by that body to the governments for their consideration.

After considerable discussion, the Eighth Assembly passed a series of resolutions dealing with disarmament and the allied problems of arbitration and security. One resolution specifically concerned the agreement in the Preparatory Commission in regard to development of civil and military aviation and stated that "it is desirable . . . that the development of civil aviation should be directed solely towards economic ends to the exclusion of military interests" and recommended that all States Members of the League should act as far as possible in accordance with the recommendations of the Preparatory Commission.

The debate on the progress of the work of the Preparatory Commission brought out in bold relief the growing impatience of the Germans with the failure of the Commission to get on with its task. Speaking in the Third Committee of the Assembly, Count Bernstorff of the German delegation said that he would like to "remind the Committee of the interpretation given by M. Clemenceau, on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers, in a Note of June 16, 1919, in which it was stated that the 'disarmament of Germany'¹⁰ also constitutes the first step towards that general reduction and limitation of armaments which the said Powers consider as one of the surest measures of preventing war, a reduction and limitation of armaments which it would be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to urge."

10. By the Treaty of Versailles, Articles 159-213, Germany was disarmed as follows:

1. The army is limited to 100,000 men.
2. The navy is limited to six small battleships and six light cruisers.
3. Submarines are forbidden entirely.
4. Conscription is abolished.
5. The number of German police is limited.
6. The amount of arms and war material in reserve is limited and can be manufactured only in certain designated factories.
7. No military or naval air forces are allowed.
8. A demilitarized neutral territory on the left bank of the Rhine and 50 km. east of the right bank has been created.
9. On her southern and eastern frontiers, Germany shall maintain the system of fortified works "in its existing state"—i.e., in the *status quo* at the end of the war.
10. An Inter-Allied Commission of Control was charged with seeing to the complete execution of the disarmament clauses of the Treaty. This Commission was withdrawn on January 31, 1927 and the supervision transferred to the Council of the League of Nations in accordance with Article 213 of the Versailles Treaty.

8. For complete description of this Conference and the issues involved, cf. F. P. A. Information Service, Vol. III, No. 21-22, *The International Naval Situation*.

9. Cf. p. 390 ff.

GERMAN IMPATIENCE

Count Bernstorff then declared that in the same note it was stated that, after Germany had shown the way, the Allied and Associated Powers could follow suit with all security, which . . . meant security by disarmament. This interpretation, agreed to by Germany in the Treaty of Versailles, was still its interpretation today. Even before Germany entered the League, the state of security had been regarded as sufficient to convene the Preparatory Commission and since Germany's entrance, the President of the Commission had stated that security had been greatly strengthened. Count Bernstorff was therefore unable to understand why security at the present time was not sufficient to render it possible to take a first step on the way to disarmament. Arbitration and security were constantly progressing, whereas disarmament had not made a single step forward since the Treaty of Versailles. "The idea was growing more and more amongst the peoples," added Count Bernstorff, "that the word 'security' was a pretext for not disarming."¹¹

Finally the Assembly adopted a resolution recalling its resolution passed a year previously (1926) which had urged the Preparatory Commission to hasten so as to convene the Disarmament Conference before the 1927 Assembly "unless material difficulties render this impossible." The 1927 resolution suggested no date for the Conference but again urged the Preparatory Commission to hasten its work. Furthermore, the 1927 Assembly provided for the appointment of a Committee on Arbitration and Security which "would be placed at the Commission's disposal and its duty would be to consider . . . measures giving all States the guarantees of arbitration and security necessary to enable them to fix the level of their armaments at the lowest possible figure in an international disarmament agreement."

The necessity for such a committee had been felt by the Preparatory Commission which was of the opinion that its labors were hampered "by the lack of a general feeling of security."

It is not within the scope of this report

11. Cf. League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 57, Records of the Eighth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Minutes of the Third Committee, p. 33.

to deal with the work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security in spite of the established interrelation of these subjects with disarmament. Suffice it to say that all the members of the Preparatory Commission with the exception of the United States and Soviet Russia have been represented at its meetings. Soviet Russia has sent an observer. The United States gave as its reason for complete non-representation, its "historic attitude toward the political problems of Europe."¹²

THE RUSSIAN PROPOSALS

From November 30 to December 3, 1927, the Preparatory Commission held its Fourth Session. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was represented for the first time at this session, the Moscow Government having wired the Secretary-General of the League late in October 1927 that it was willing to participate.¹³

Besides constituting the Committee on Arbitration and Security, which held its first meeting immediately in Geneva, the Preparatory Commission at its Fourth Session discussed "the progress of the work" of disarmament. Immediately after the opening of the debate, M. Litvinoff, chief of the Soviet delegation, delivered a speech on the disarmament work of the League, characterizing all the work done by the Preparatory Commission as of a "purely decorative nature."¹⁴

"The reluctance," said M. Litvinoff, "to put into practice the policy of disarmament was manifested both in the methods adopted and the alternation of the questions of disarmament and guarantees, while simultaneous attempts were made to sum up in detail all the factors determining the armed power of the various countries concerned. Such a setting of the question, evoking endless and fruitless arguments on so-called military potential, affords an opportunity for the indefinite postponement of the fundamental and decisive question: the actual dimensions of disarmament."

After recounting the endeavors of the So-

12. Cf. League of Nations, C.667.M.225, p. 18, also C.310.M.109, p. 273-4.

13. The U. S. S. R. had been invited by the Council on December 12, 1925 to participate in the Preparatory Commission's work. Owing to strained Russo-Swiss relations because of the murder of the chief Soviet delegate at the Lausanne (Switzerland) Conference in May 1923, the U. S. S. R. declined. When in April 15, 1927 the Swiss Government made apologies acceptable to Russia, Moscow accepted an invitation to participate in the League Economic Conference and then in the Preparatory Disarmament Commission.

14. C.667.M.225, p. 9.

viet Government "to get the question of disarmament definitely and practically formulated," M. Litvinoff announced that his government had authorized the Soviet delegation to propose the complete abolition of all land, naval and air forces. A detailed plan to this end was then presented to the Commission which provided in part as follows:

1. Disbandment of all armed land, air and naval forces.
2. Destruction of all arms, warships, military airships, fortresses, and factories for military production.
3. Abolition of any form of compulsory military service.
4. Suppression of appropriations for war purposes.
5. Abolition of war, naval, and military aviation ministries and chiefs of staff.
6. Legislative prohibition of all military propaganda and military instruction of the young by State organizations and public societies.
7. Promulgation of laws according to which the violation of the above-mentioned clauses would be considered a serious crime against the State.

M. Litvinoff, in introducing this plan, argued for its simplicity and said apropos of the Preparatory Commission's deliberations: "I confess that, on acquainting myself with the findings of this Commission, I was aghast at the complexity, confusion and multiplicity of the questions with which that of disarmament has become involved." He then moved a resolution (1) that the Commission proceed at once to work out a draft convention on the principles proposed by the U. S. S. R., and (2) proposing "the convocation, not later than March 1928, of a disarmament conference for the discussion and confirmation of the proposals" for complete and general disarmament.

The introduction of the Soviet plan seems to have taken the Preparatory Commission completely by surprise and on the suggestion of Count Bernstorff, its consideration was postponed until the next session of the Commission at which time, the second reading of the Commission's own draft convention was to begin.¹⁵

The fixing of a date for this Fifth Session occasioned considerable debate; the Russians proposed January 10, 1928—i.e., a month after the adjournment of the Fourth Session.

Count Bernstorff urged an early date in order to allow for the possibility of convening the Disarmament Conference during 1928. After a good deal of discussion, March 15 was finally agreed upon.

FIFTH SESSION OF PREPARATORY COMMISSION, MARCH 15-24, 1928

For the first time, Turkey sent a representative to the Commission, its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tewfik Rouchdy Bey, taking part in the discussions. The Commission discussed the Russian proposals introduced at the Fourth Session and a lively and in some instances acrimonious debate ensued. In all, nineteen speakers commented on the Russian plan, after Count Bernstorff and the Turkish delegate had warmly urged that it be discussed.

M. Litvinoff led off by stressing his point that nothing but general, simultaneous and complete disarmament was capable of satisfactorily solving the problem of general security and peace. He reported that the Soviet proposal had been accepted with enthusiasm by the great masses of the people of both hemispheres and again sharply criticized the League for its failure to accomplish anything in the field of disarmament. Finally, he stated that his proposition represented a single, organic whole which could not be split into separate parts, and asked for an unequivocal answer as to whether the Commission would base its further labors on the principle of complete disarmament and agree to carry out the first stage within a year. In calling on the members of the Commission publicly to expound the views of their governments on the Soviet proposal, M. Litvinoff added that his delegation considered itself

"entitled to count upon special support from the delegation of that government which is now publicly making a proposal for the prohibition of war. The sincerity of this proposal could not be more convincingly confirmed than by the adherence of its authors to the Soviet draft convention for complete disarmament, pursuing the aim not merely of the moral prohibition but also of the abolition of the possibility of war. Since armed forces have no other *raison d'être* but the conduct of war and since the prohibition of war would make them quite superfluous, it would appear that consistency and logic must dictate to the government concerned the support of our proposal."¹⁶

15. C.667.M.225. p. 17. Statement of President Loudon.

16. C.165.M.50, p. 241.

CRITICISM OF THE RUSSIAN PROPOSALS

CUSHENDUN
CHALLENGES RUSSIA

In the discussion, the most detailed and also perhaps the most acrimonious speech was made by Lord Cushendun of Britain who injected a new element in the discussion by asking flatly "in what spirit the Soviet Government [had] sent a representative to take part in [the] proceedings" of the Preparatory Commission. He then accused the Russians of coming to Geneva after seven years of reviling and deriding the League's disarmament work, only to sabotage the League itself. "The purpose of the Soviet delegates," said Lord Cushendun, "is not really to give us any genuine assistance in the work upon which we are engaged, but . . . there is an ulterior motive, and I think we are entitled to know what that ulterior motive is."¹⁷ He then pointed out that the Soviet proposal made no mention whatsoever of the League of Nations and in fact was not compatible with the terms of the Covenant. He asked the Russian delegates point blank whether they "set their face against civil war *i.e.*, revolution as against international war," and referred to what he termed Soviet interference in the affairs of other nations, in unambiguous terms, intimating that the purpose of the Russian proposal was to remove obstacles to world revolution in bourgeois countries.

On the other hand M. Politis of Greece pointed out that the undertaking of League Members to reduce their armaments under Article 8 of the Covenant is limited in two ways: "In the first place, in effecting the reductions, regard is to be paid to national security;" the other limitation consists in the fact that the States Members "are bound to retain a minimum armament sufficient to ensure the success of any common action" to enforce the Covenant—*i.e.*, under the sanctions of Article 16. M. Politis therefore regarded the Soviet proposal as "diametrically opposed to the two-fold rule laid down in Article 8."

Many other delegates spoke against the Soviet scheme and the consensus of opinion was that it constituted such an entirely different approach to the problem of disarma-

ment than the previous work of the Preparatory Commission, that it was impossible of acceptance. In the course of the debate, Mr. Gibson stated the opinion of the United States delegation as follows:¹⁸

" . . . It is precisely on grounds of sincerity, consistency and logic that my Government supports the idea of a multilateral pact renouncing war as an instrument of national policy, and at the same time finds itself unable to support drastic proposals for immediate and complete disarmament which we do not believe are calculated to achieve their avowed purpose. Any other attitude on the part of my Government, Mr. President, would be lacking in sincerity, consistency and logic, for my Government believes in one project and disbelieves in the other. We believe that the idea behind the proposal of a pact for renouncing war can be made effective as an articulate expression of an almost universal will for peace. We believe that such an expression is more effective at this time than any scheme, however drastic, for doing away with weapons. We have always stated our conviction that, as we build up the will for peace and confidence in peaceful methods for settling international disputes, through regional agreements or otherwise, our need for armaments will automatically decrease. We have never believed that the converse was true, and that the suppression of armaments would alone and by itself have the effect of creating that confidence which is essential to the successful conclusion of our task."

LITVINOFF'S
REPLY

Litvinoff's reply to the objections raised was as follows:

"We knew that one of the biggest States had come forward with a proposal for the prohibition of war, and, having our own conception of logic and consistency, considered ourselves entitled to reckon on the support of this government for our proposal, but the representative of this government did not consider it necessary to lay his point of view before us, unless we are to consider convincing his declaration here that he believed in one scheme and not in another. On the other hand, the criticism of our draft Convention was based on profound distrust, on the assumption that a solemnly accepted international convention is bound to be infringed, while, on the other, we are assured that when two neighbors, armed to the teeth, give a solemn promise not to attack each other, only then can the preservation of peace be hoped for. But

17. *Ibid.* p. 246.

18. C.165.M.50, p. 258.

when these neighbors supplement their solemn promise by undertaking to disarm and by actually disarming, we are told that not only will this not increase for them both the existing security, but it will actually decrease it. Thus, we learn, disarmed nations are still more dangerous to each other than armed! *Credo quia absurdum!*¹⁹

The rest of the discussion brought out charges and countercharges of bad faith, a demand by Germany for immediate settlement of a date for a general disarmament conference and Franco-German recriminations in regard to fulfillment of treaty pledges. Finally the British reiterated their proposal made at the Three Power Naval Conference for reduction of capital ship tonnage. The Russians, faced with the *fait accompli* of the rejection of their proposal for total disarmament, thereupon introduced a new scheme for "partial gradual disarmament." This, the Soviet delegation stated, it would regard "as the first stage on the way to total disarmament." The important points of the new plan were:

1. Division of the world into four groups according to size of armaments and reduction according to category—States with large

forces reducing the most. Application of the same principle to reduction of naval tonnage.

2. Abolition of air warfare, poison-gas, tanks, long-range guns, high calibre artillery.
3. A permanent international control commission composed of legislative and workers' representatives.

For the most part, the rest of the Fifth Session of the Preparatory Commission was concerned with setting a date for its next session. The German delegate, seconded by the Russian, argued long and stoutly for setting a date for the actual Disarmament Conference. Finally, the Commission decided to leave its President, M. Loudon, free to convene the Commission when it would be practically useful and, if possible, before the 1928 Assembly.

At the same time it was decided to refer the second Soviet proposal to the governments without discussion.

The Fifth Session of the Preparatory Commission adjourned on March 24, 1928 and no subsequent session has as yet been held. The draft Convention together with the Russian proposals are before the governments for their consideration.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH ACCORD

On July 30, 1928 the world was startled by an announcement made by Sir Austen Chamberlain, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the course of a speech on the Kellogg Anti-War Pact in the House of Commons, that conversations between Britain and France had been proceeding and that a tentative agreement as to a basis of naval limitation had been reached. Sir Austen added:

"I am about to communicate to the other principal naval powers the compromise at which we have arrived, with the hope that it may be acceptable to them also, and that thus a great obstacle to progress will have been removed and a step made in advance."²⁰

While the fact that these conversations were taking place had not apparently been generally known to the public, the existence of the negotiations was made known to all the governments on the Preparatory Commission at its last session in March, which

was public. At that time, Count Clauzel of France informed the Commission that it was hoped that some final settlement of the delicate questions at issue would be reached as speedily as possible. He added that "one of the conditions of such settlement... is an exchange of views... between governments. I am glad to say that we are far advanced along this path and there is no occasion to anticipate any very long delay before we arrive at appreciable results."²¹

Mr. Gibson (U. S.) made it perfectly clear in his remarks to the Commission that he felt that negotiations outside the plenary sessions were valuable and necessary to the advancement of the work. He said:

"... At the conclusion of the first reading, there were so many points of disagreement that we felt that nothing further could be accomplished in public meetings until after an effort had been made by direct negotiations between the various governments and between groups of governments to find a way, through mutual concession to eliminate existing divergencies."²²

19. C.165.M.50, p. 275.

20. Papers regarding the Limitation of Naval Armaments, Cmd. 3211, H. M. Stationery Office, London, 1928, pp. 28-29; London Times, July 31, 1928, p. 8.

21. C.165.M.50, p. 277.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 278.

Lord Cushendun of Britain reinforced Count Clauzel's earlier statement by saying that although he did not know the precise stage which the Franco-British conversations had reached, since they were not "in his hands personally," he did know that Count Clauzel had "perfect justification for the information he [had] given." The Italian delegate, General de Marinis, announced to the Commission that he was not aware of these conversations and added that "if these conversations are really taking place and being carried on outside Italy, and if they do result in an agreement, such an agreement will mean nothing so far as we are concerned, because we had no part in it."²³ The Japanese delegate on the other hand, characterized the statements of Count Clauzel and Lord Cushendun as "good news,"²⁴ and the President of the Commission, spoke of them as "very encouraging."

OPINION OF THE PRESS

Nevertheless, Chamberlain's announcement which was made rather casually and before the agreement had been communicated to the principal naval powers, raised a storm of disapproval. Although Rome, Tokyo and Washington were sent summaries of the agreement early in August, the text was not published until October 22, three months after Chamberlain's announcement in the House of Commons. In the interval rumors were spread that Britain and France had concluded another *Entente Cordiale* and that the British navy and the French army were henceforth to be considered as a unit in international dealings. American and German opinion as well as British Liberal and Labor circles were great disturbed. When the terms of the agreement leaked out²⁵ public opinion in the United States was aroused. It was felt that especially since Washington had not been informed previous to Chamberlain's announcement, the agreement was aimed specifically against the United States.

TEXT OF ANGLO-FRENCH ACCORD

The text of the naval agreement as finally published on October 22, is as follows:

23. *Ibid.* p. 297.

24. *Ibid.* p. 302.

25. Through the *New York American*, September 21, 1928.

"Limitations which the Disarmament Conference will have to determine will deal with four classes of warships:—

- (1) Capital ships, *i.e.*, ships of over 10,000 tons or with guns of more than 8-inch calibre.
- (2) Aircraft carriers of over 10,000 tons.
- (3) Surface vessels of or below 10,000 tons armed with guns more than 6-inch and up to 8-inch calibre.
- (4) Ocean-going submarines, *i.e.*, over 600 tons.

The Washington Treaty regulates limitations in classes (1) and (2), and the Disarmament Conference will only have to consider the method of extending these limitations to Powers non-signatory to this treaty.

As regards classes (3) and (4), the final Disarmament Conference will fix a maximum tonnage applicable to all Powers which no Power will be allowed to exceed for the total of vessels in each of these respective categories, during the period covered by the Convention. Within this maximum limit each Power will at the final conference indicate for each of these categories the tonnage they propose to reach and which they undertake not to exceed during the period covered by the Convention."²⁶

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ACCORD

The significance of the agreement is that France agreed to abandon her fight for naval limitation by global tonnage²⁷ and accepted the British and American thesis that ships should be limited by categories or classes. Great Britain in the Accord agreed that France should build an unlimited number of submarines under 600 tons by the stipulation that only submarines over 600 tons shall be subject to limitation. By stating that "surface vessels of or below 10,000 tons armed with guns of more than 6-inch and up to 8-inch calibre are to be limited, the British and French agreed in essence that only larger cruisers—those above approximately 7,500 tons and armed with 8-inch guns—should be limited. Cruisers of 7,500 tons and below customarily mount 6-inch guns while larger vessels above 7,500 tons and of or below 10,000 tons are capable of mounting guns of more than 6-inch and up to and including 8-inch calibre. Furthermore, as the Three Power Naval Conference in 1927 brought out, it is possible to mount 6-inch guns on merchant vessels, thus converting them in time of war to

26. Cmd. 3211, pp. 26-27.

27. Cf. p. 384.

war vessels. Thus the understanding limits only those types of ships most adapted to the needs of the United States. It secured the support of the French Government—which did not participate in the Three Power Naval Conference—for an even more extreme position than that taken by Great Britain at that Conference. By this agreement, Great Britain apparently wished to break the deadlock with the United States by means of French support.

The correspondence preceding the agreement, together with the text and the replies from Italy, Japan and the United States was finally published in London and Paris on October 22, largely as the result of the insistent pressure of public opinion both in Britain and abroad. From the correspondence it is clear that the suggestion of asking the opinion of the other naval powers, notably of the United States, in regard to the agreement was made originally by France.²⁸

PROTEST OF THE UNITED STATES

Washington, on September 28, stated its opinion of the Accord in identic notes addressed to Paris and London. "The Government of the United States," the notes declared, "feels that no useful purpose would be served by accepting as a basis of discussion the Franco-British proposal." The chief points of the notes may be summarized as follows:

(1) The Franco-British proposal applies only to the limitation of cruisers "of or below 10,000 tons, armed with guns of more than six-inch and up to eight-inch calibre, and submarines of over 600 tons." Thus it is proposed to impose restrictions only on those types of vessels "peculiarly suited to the needs of the United States." Furthermore, such restrictions "would add enormously to the comparative offensive power of a nation possessing a large merchant tonnage on which preparation may be made in times of peace for mounting six-inch guns."

(2) These proposals are incompatible with the American position at the Geneva Three Power Conference and "even more unacceptable than the proposal put forward by the British Delegation at that Conference not only because it puts the United States at a decided disadvantage but also because it discards altogether the

principle of limitation as applied to important combatant types of vessels."

(3) In regard to submarines, the "American Government cannot accept as a distinct class of submarines those of over 600 tons," leaving all others unlimited. "The United States would gladly, in conjunction with all the nations of the world, abolish the submarine altogether." If this is impossible, Washington believes that submarines "should be limited to a reasonable tonnage or number."

(4) "The Government of the United States remains willing to use its best efforts to obtain a basis of further naval limitation satisfactory to all the naval powers." Furthermore, it is willing to take into consideration the "special needs of France, Italy or any other naval power for the particular class of vessels deemed by them most suitable for their defense. . . . It expects on the part of others, however, similar consideration for its own needs."

THE JAPANESE REPLY

The Japanese reply is dated September 29 and "expresses its concurrence to the purport of the present agreement." It adds, however, that since "maximum tonnage of large cruisers and submarines to be applied indiscriminately to all countries must, from the point of view of national security and of alleviation of the burden on the people, be satisfactory to various countries whose circumstances are different, [Japan] considers [the] agreement in question needs to be most carefully drawn up and just."

Italy replied on October 6 and while making some counter proposals, refused to accept the Franco-British Agreement as a basis for discussion. The Italian note states that Italy "could not concur in a separate discussion of the naval problem" and, stresses the interdependence of armaments.²⁹ It adds that "an indication in this sense" can be detected in the connection which the proposal in fact introduces "between the naval proposals and the question of the 'trained reserves' of the army." The note stresses the point that Italy "is disposed *a priori* to accept as a limit for its own armaments any figures, however low they may be, provided that they are not exceeded by any other European continental Power." In regard to naval limitation, Italy stands firm for limitation by global tonnage.³⁰

Although Chamberlain, in his July 30 an-

28. Cmd. 3211, p. 22-25, note from French Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Britain.

29. Cf. p. 383.

30. The texts of all the replies are printed in Cmd. 3211.

nouncement in the House of Commons had implied that the accord dealt only with naval matters, the British Opposition press and in particular the Liberal *Manchester Guardian* had at once accused the Government of having made a concession to France or land armaments in return for the French agreement to limit navies by categories instead of global tonnage. In an editorial published on August 3, the *Guardian* suggested that this *quid pro quo* took the form of British support for the French thesis that trained reserves cannot be limited. Although this editorial raised a storm of protest in the French press, the correspondence subsequently published, proves that the British had promised to withdraw their contention that trained reserves should be limited, and that Downing Street regarded this as a necessary *quid pro quo*. In the record of a conversation held in Geneva on March 9, 1928 between Briand and Chamberlain, the latter made the point that:

"Public opinion realized that concessions were necessary from all parties for a general settlement to be reached, and if he could point to a concession by the French in naval matters it would probably acquiesce in his yielding a point on the military side. On the other hand, we could not abandon the British standpoint on the question of army reserves unless we could justify this concession by pointing to a similar concession made to us in the naval sphere."³¹

On June 26, Chamberlain wrote the Marquess of Crewe in Paris definitely to the same effect,³² and the latter passed on the information to Briand.

REJECTION OF THE ACCORD

The official reception which was accorded the Anglo-French Agreement in Tokyo and Rome and more especially in Washington, coupled with the storm of opposition which it aroused in the American and British press, not to mention its very cool reception in Germany, have finally led to its official renunciation by Lord Cushendun, British Acting Foreign Secretary. Presumably therefore, the now defunct Accord will have no effect on the next session of the Preparatory Commission, at least as far as naval problems are concerned. Although officially at least, Britain appears to have returned to

her former stand in regard to trained reserves, Lord Cushendun's statement in the House of Lords might be interpreted to forecast a change. He said that while the British delegates to the next session of the Preparatory Commission had not as yet received their instructions, it would be necessary to instruct them in regard to trained reserves. "We have not altered our view," said he, "that the limitation of land armament must be very partial and probably ineffective unless trained reserves are included. But we should find it perfectly hopeless to get France, and practically all the military nations on the Continent to adopt our views on this."³³

THE NINTH LEAGUE ASSEMBLY

When the Ninth League Assembly met in Geneva in September 1928, the date for the Sixth Session of the Preparatory Commission had not been fixed and aside from the Anglo-French Naval Accord, the deadlock as expressed in the Commission's draft convention still persisted.

The 1928 Assembly was the scene of lively debates on the subject which centered around the calling of the Commission and the fixing of a date for the Disarmament Conference itself. The most important development was the increasing impatience of the German delegation, supported by the Hungarians, with the failure of the League to achieve actual results in limiting armaments. This impatience found expression both in the Third Committee of the Assembly³⁴ and in plenary session.

In a speech at the seventh plenary meeting on September 7, Chancellor Müller of Germany said frankly that he viewed the present disarmament situation with serious concern. "For nearly three years," said he, "the Preparatory Commission has been holding one session after another; but it has not seriously attacked; far less completed, the work assigned to it." The Chancellor went on to restate the German position, so often elaborated by Count Bernstorff in the Preparatory Commission and then said flatly that, "The disarmament of Germany cannot possibly continue to be a unilateral act, the outcome solely of the power wielded by the

31. Cmd. 3211, p. 17.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 21,22.

33. *New York Times*, November 8, 1928, p. 1.

34. The Third Committee always deals with disarmament.

victors in the World War. The promise that Germany's disarmament would be fulfilled, and, finally, the article of the Covenant which incorporates that promise as a basic principle of the League of Nations must be carried into effect . . . Can there be any doubt that the failure of the League to solve this disarmament question is bound to produce the most serious consequences?" He then urged the Assembly to set a date for the convening of the Disarmament Conference and to end the technical work of the Preparatory Commission.

Many other speakers urged the Preparatory Commission to hasten its work, and some pointed to the signature of the Kellogg Anti-War Pact as a further guarantee of security making possible real disarmament. An answer to Chancellor Müller was made by M. Briand in a speech on September 10 in the tenth plenary meeting. The French Foreign Minister pointed out that it was only recently that the Germans had carried out the disarmament terms of the Peace Treaty. But this disarmament could not be regarded as complete for Germany's army of 100,000 men was composed of officers and non-commissioned officers, while there existed at hand an immense reservoir of trained men. Furthermore Germany's great industrial organization could be turned almost at once from manufacturing the instruments of peace into manufacturing the instruments of war. Therefore France must continue to take precautions. "In the future a limitation [of armaments] in proportion to the degree of security achieved, is a certainty. But in order not to trouble this atmosphere problems that are too delicate should not be immediately discussed."

In the Third Committee, Germany and Hungary pressed for action in speech after speech. M. Loudon, speaking as President of the Preparatory Commission told the Third Committee that it was useless to con-

vene his Commission "before the Great Powers had settled their divergencies of view," although he was very anxious to hasten the work of that Commission.

The Third Committee finally prepared a resolution to be submitted to the Assembly, which the Committee adopted unanimously except for the significant abstentions of the Hungarian and German delegates. In the Assembly debate on this resolution, General Tanczos (Hungary) said that since the resolution contained no allusion to the convening of a first disarmament conference, it did not even permit of a modest hope. "Accordingly the present humiliating position of Hungary as a country unilaterally disarmed would be prolonged in spite of the provisions of Article 8 of the Covenant and Chapter 5 of the Treaty of Trianon." Count Bernstorff (Germany) stated that his delegation "could not assume responsibility for the new delays which would result from the present resolution." The Reich would, however, loyally collaborate in the work contemplated by the Assembly.

The resolution was passed on September 25 with the significant abstentions of Hungary and Germany. It urges that "the first step towards reduction and limitation of armaments" be accomplished with as little delay as possible. It "notes with satisfaction the efforts of certain Governments to prepare the ground for the future work of the Preparatory Commission" and urges other governments to resolve their differences without delay so that the work of the Commission can be brought to a successful issue. And finally, the resolution instructs the President of the Preparatory Commission "to keep in contact with the Governments concerned so that he may be apprised of the progress of their negotiations and may be able to convene the Commission at the end of the present year, or, in any case, at the beginning of 1929."

SUMMARY OF NAVAL STATISTICS

The Armistice Day speech of President Coolidge in which he urged that the United States build more cruisers and quoted figures showing that this country is inferior to Britain in cruiser strength, makes timely the publication of tables showing the actual strength of the two principal naval powers—Britain and the United States.

The following tables, prepared by the Washington Bureau of the Foreign Policy Association and based upon data furnished by the office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department contain not only the actual strength of the two principal naval powers, but they show as well the ages of the various vessels. This is an important factor in estimating the relative strength of the two navies.

Relative Strength of the United States Navy and British Navy Based on Data Furnished by the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department—Information as of October 1, 1927, and August 1, 1928.

Table 1—First line cruisers, all sizes (3,000 to 10,000 tons, 27 knots plus).

COUNTRY	BUILT		BUILDING		APP'R. FOR		TOTAL	
	Number	Tons	Number	Tons	Number	Tons	No.	Tons
United States	10	75,000	8	80,000	0	None	18	155,000
British Empire	46	260,810	8	76,000	2	18,000 ¹	56	354,810

1. Great Britain has announced that these two ships will not be laid down this year as originally planned. Three more cruisers (one 10,000 tons, two 8,000 tons) were projected in the Five Year Birkenhead program adopted in 1925. They have not been appropriated for and the British Government has not announced when they will be built.

Other Factors Affecting Comparative Strength of Navies

The comparative strength of modern navies cannot be based on numbers and total tonnage alone. Such factors as age, size, armaments, and speed are equally important, as indicated by the testimony of Admiral Hughes before the House Naval Affairs Committee, in arriving at a sound basis of comparison. The following tables and summaries provide additional data relating to these important factors.

Comparative Strength in Large First Line Cruisers, 7,500 to 10,000 Tons, Built and Building

Country	Number	Tons
United States	18	155,000
British Empire	21	200,100

Comparative Strength in Large, First Line Cruisers, 7,500 Tons to 10,000 Tons in 1931 if the 15

United States Cruisers Requested in H. R. 11526 are Built and the Present British Program is Carried Out

Country	Number	Tons
United States	33	305,000
British Empire	26	244,100

Comparative Strength in First Line Cruisers, all Sizes, in 1931 (3,000-10,000 Tons, 27 Knots Plus) if the 15 U. S. Cruisers Requested in H. R. 11526 are Built and the Present British Program is Carried Out

Country	Number	Tons
United States	33	305,000
British Empire	59	380,000

CRUISER TYPES

CL Light Cruisers, First Line (5-8-inch Guns; 3,000-10,000 Tons; 27 Knots Plus)

UNITED STATES

Name	Laid down	Com- pleted	Displ. (long tons)	Speed	Battery	Tor- pedo tubes
				Main	Antiair- craft	
Built:						
1. Omaha	1918	1923	7,500	34.9	12.6"	4.3"
2. Milwaukee	1918	1923	7,500	34.6	12.6"	4.3"
3. Cincinnati	1920	1923	7,500	34.4	12.6"	4.3"
4. Raleigh	1920	1924	7,500	34.6	12.6"	4.3"
5. Detroit	1920	1923	7,500	34.6	12.6"	4.3"
6. Richmond	1920	1923	7,500	34.2	12.6"	4.3"
7. Concord	1920	1923	7,500	33.5	12.6"	4.3"
8. Trenton	1920	1924	7,500	33.7	12.6"	4.3"
9. Marblehead	1920	1924	7,500	33.7	12.6"	4.3"
10. Memphis	1920	1925	7,500	33.7	12.6"	4.3"
Total (10)			75,000			
Building:						
11. Pensacola	1926	50%	10,000	32.5	10.8"	4.5"
12. Salt Lake City	1927	60%	10,000	32.5	10.8"	4.5"
13. Chester	28%		10,000	32.7	9.8"	4.5"
14. C. C. No. 26	28%		10,000	32.7	9.8"	4.5"
15. Augusta	17%		10,000	32.7	9.8"	4.5"
16. C. C. No. 28	12%		10,000	32.7	9.8"	4.5"
17. Chicago	7%		10,000	32.7	9.8"	4.5"
18. Houston	29%		10,000	32.7	9.8"	4.5"
Total (8)			80,000			
Grand total (18)			155,000			

CRUISER TYPES

CL Light Cruisers, First Line (5-8-inch Guns; 3,000-10,000 Tons; 27 Knots Plus)

BRITISH EMPIRE

Name	Laid down	Com-pleted	Displ. (long tons)	Speed	Main	Battery	Tor-pedo tubes
					Antiair-craft		
Built:							
1. Comus	1913	1915	3,750	29	4-6"	2-3"	4
2. Conquest	1914	1915	3,750	29	3-6"	2-3"	4
3. Carysfort	1914	1915	3,750	29	4-6"	2-3"	4
4. Cleopatra	1914	1915	3,750	29	4-6"	2-3"	4
5. Calliope	1914	1915	3,750	29	4-6"	2-3"	2
6. Champion	1914	1915	3,750	29	4-6"	1-3"	6
7. Castor	1914	1915	3,750	29	4-6"	2-3"	2
8. Cambrian	1914	1916	3,750	29	4-6"	2-3"	2
9. Canterbury	1914	1916	3,750	29	4-6"	2-3"	2
10. Constance	1915	1916	3,750	29	4-6"	2-3"	2
11. Centaur	1915	1916	3,750	29	4-6"	2-3"	2
12. Concord	1915	1916	3,750	29	5-6"	2-3"	2
13. Caradoc	1916	1917	4,120	29	5-6"	2-3"	8
14. Calypso	1916	1917	4,120	29	5-6"	2-3"	8
15. Caledon	1916	1917	4,120	29	5-6"	2-3"	8
16. Cardiff	1916	1917	4,190	29	5-6"	2-3"	8
17. Coventry	1916	1918	4,190	29	5-6"	2-3"	8
18. Curlew	1916	1917	4,190	29	5-6"	2-3"	8
19. Ceres	1916	1917	4,190	29	5-6"	2-3"	8
20. Curacao	1916	1918	4,190	29	5-6"	2-3"	8
21. Danae	1916	1918	4,650	29	6-6"	3-4"	12
22. Frobisher	1916	1924	9,750	30.5	7-7.5"	3-4"	6
23. Hawkins	1916	1919	9,750	30	7-7.5"	4-4"	6
24. Vindictive	1916	1918	9,750	30	6-7.5"	3-4"	6
25. Cairo	1917	1919	4,190	29	5-6"	2-3"	8
26. Calcutta	1917	1919	4,190	29	5-6"	2-3"	8
27. Carlisle	1917	1918	4,190	29	5-6"	2-3"	8
28. Colombo	1917	1919	4,190	29	5-6"	2-3"	8
29. Effingham	1917	1925	9,770	30.5	7-7.5"	3-4"	5
30. Dauntless	1917	1918	4,650	29	6-6"	3-4"	12
31. Dragon	1917	1918	4,650	29	6-6"	3-4"	12
32. Dunedin	1917	1919	4,650	29	6-6"	3-4"	12
33. Delhi	1917	1919	4,650	29	6-6"	3-4"	12
34. Despatch	1918	1922	4,765	29	6-6"	3-4"	12
35. Durban	1918	1921	4,650	29	6-6"	3-4"	12
36. Diomede	1918	1922	4,765	29	6-6"	3-4"	12
37. Capetown	1918	1922	4,190	29	5-6"	2-3"	8
38. Emerald	1918	1926	7,550	33	7-6"	3-4"	12
39. Enterprise	1918	1926	7,550	33	7-6"	3-4"	12
40. Kent	1924	1928	10,000	31.5	8-8"	4-4"	8
41. Cornwall	1924	1928	10,000	31.5	8-8"	4-4"	8
42. Cumberland	1924	1928	10,000	31.5	8-8"	4-4"	8
43. Suffolk	1924	1928	10,000	31.5	8-8"	4-4"	8
44. Berwick	1924	1928	10,000	31.5	8-8"	4-4"	8
45. Australia (A)	1925	1928	10,000	31.5	8-8"	4-4"	8
46. Canberra (A)	1925	1928	10,000	31.5	8-8"	4-4"	8
Total (46)			260,810				
Building:							
47. London	1926	10,000	33	8-8"	4-4"	12
48. Devonshire	1926	10,000	33	8-8"	4-4"	12
49. Shropshire	1927	10,000	33	8-8"	4-4"	12
50. Sussex	1927	10,000	33	8-8"	4-4"	12
51. Dorsetshire	1927	10,000			
52. Norfolk	1927	10,000			
53. York	1927	8,000			
54. Essex	1928	8,000			
Total (8)			76,000				
Appropriated for:							
55.	10,000			
56.	8,000			
Total (2)			18,000				
Grand total (56)			354,810				

1. Two totalling 18,000 tons will not be used this year.

(A) Built for Australia.